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William G. Thomas, III*
William Jennings Bryan, the
Railroads, and the Politics
of "Workingmen"
Early in his career as a lawyer William Jennings Bryan took a
principled position that set him apart from many of his colleagues at
the bar. When he teamed up with Dolph Talbot in a law practice in
Lincoln in 1887, the state was growing faster than any other in the
nation in that decade, catapulting from 450,000 residents to over 1
million. It was a promising field for the law business by any measure.
Talbot took on a wide spectrum of clientele and represented the Mis-
souri Pacific Railroad, but Bryan refused "to accept money from a rail-
road company."' This in itself was remarkable, as attorneys in fast-
growing towns and cities across the west and south vied for the oppor-
tunity to claim such a steadily lucrative client. The list of prominent
railroad attorneys who made their way into politics was long and dis-
tinguished, from Abraham Lincoln of Illinois to Thomas S. Martin of
Virginia. As the bar became increasingly professionalized, and at the
same time increasingly split between trial and corporate lawyers even
in the small towns and cities of the west, Bryan stood squarely on the
side opposed to the corporation. His law practice featured a handful of
cases in which he opposed the railroads-a tort case representing a
seven-year-old girl struck by a Missouri Pacific train in Lincoln, a case
for a contractor who had put a lien on the railroad company for pay-
ment of services, and a case involving the validity of votes to move a
county seat from one railroad line to another. Bryan, it seemed, went
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out of his way to maintain his political purity and to keep his distance
from the largest special interests of the day-the railroads.2
Later, in his political career, Bryan tried to turn this principled
position into a virtue and at key moments took a vigorous stand
against the railroads. His opposition to the railroads, it turns out, was
remarkably consistent, and throughout his career he tried to focus
widespread resentment against the big corporations into meaningful
political change and greater economic opportunity for working people.
After a trip to Europe in 1906, he was so impressed with the efficiency
of government-run rail that he came back convinced the United States
should make the railroads a publicly owned enterprise, a stance he
had avoided earlier. Indeed, he quickly backed away from this idea
only to return to it again in 1919. The railroads and the corporate
power they symbolized were a political lodestar for Bryan, guiding his
course through decades of his political life, a reference point again and
again to gain his bearings on the problem of economic and social jus-
tice for the laboring classes. The political problem Bryan faced
throughout his career was how to confront the railroads successfully,
for after all they were, in effect, both the engine of corruption and the
engine of growth.
Michael Kazin's biography of Bryan, A Godly Hero: The Life of Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, views Bryan more as a progressive reformer
than as a populist crusader. Kazin's central concern is to recover
Bryan from the devastating obituary written by H.L. Mencken, who
presented Bryan as a vestige of an earlier era, little more than a hap-
less hick bumbling about in the modern world.3 Kazin, on the other
hand, allows Bryan to stand as a transitional figure to the modern era
in both his Christian liberalism and his progressive vision for the po-
litical economy. Despite his arrogant refusal to take railroad clients
and his long flirtation with populism, Bryan was no throwback. He
made a concerted attempt throughout his career to resolve a very
modern problem-how to realign the Democratic Party so that it rep-
resented the broad working and middle classes in an aggressively
growth-oriented political economy.
2. See generally Andrew B. Koszewski, William Jennings Bryan's Law Practice in
Nebraska, 1887-1891 (1991) (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln) (on file with author). On the growth of the law business in the west, see
Kelly Paulson, Lawyers and the American West: An Empirical Investigation into
the Components of Demand for Legal Services from 1850 to 1930 (May 4, 2005)
(unpublished Honors Thesis, Stanford University) (on file with author). On the
South and the separation of the law business in this period, see WILLIAM G.
THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BusINEss, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW
SOUTH (Louisiana State University Press, 1999).
3. KAZIN, supra note 1, at 298-99. H.L. Mencken, Bryan, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN,
July 27, 1925.
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The full dimensions of this problem became widely apparent in
Bryan's 1894 campaign for the United States Senate when, at the
height of railroad abuse and power and in the midst of a crippling
depression, Bryan ran against John M. Thurston, the Union Pacific's
general counsel. In many ways, the 1894 Senate campaign in Ne-
braska became a dress rehearsal for the presidential run two years
later. In his Senate campaign, Bryan began his move to pull populist
energy into the Nebraska Democratic Party and faced the counter-
vailing and contradictory politics presented by the "railroad problem."
The line between populist demagogue (or "class warfare") and fair de-
bate over economic issues has been a thin one ever since Bryan's cam-
paign. Bryan confronted politically active economic interests (the
railroads) aligned with the Republican Party, as well as a Republican
Party adapting its rhetoric to defend the "workingman" in a modern
economy. Gender was especially important in shaping these political
confrontations, as Republicans confronted Bryan's democratic/popu-
lism with arguments linking their party through the tariff and other
policies to the interests of workingmen, the benefits of railroad
growth, and the values (such as manhood) inherent in Civil War ser-
vice. The dilemma Bryan faced was how to attract the votes of work-
ingmen and get them to vote in their "class interests" without crossing
an arbitrary line into so-called "class warfare" or demagoguery. 4
Bryan found the modern, railroad-driven economy morally prob-
lematic. He was not alone, of course. Henry Adams once remarked,
"The generation between 1865 and 1895 was already mortgaged to the
railways, and no one knew it better than the generation itself."5 Ad-
ams could see that railroads were "but one active interest, to which all
others were subservient, and which absorbed the energies of some
sixty million people to the exclusion of every other force, real or imagi-
nary."6 They seemed, in other words, to pull everything and everyone
into their orbit.
Earlier generations of Americans applauded the railroad, indeed
had chanted its arrival as synonymous with civilization. Harriet
Beecher Stowe, in Uncle Tom's Cabin, used railroads as a proxy for
everything modern and advanced about the country, ignoring along
4. For an overview of the political currents in this period and the new historical
approaches to them, see THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian Zelizer,
eds., Princeton University Press, 2003), especially REBECCA EDWARDS, "Domestic-
ity versus Manhood Rights: Republicans, Democrats, and 'Family Values' Polit-
ics, 1856-1896," in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 175. On gender and the politics
of this period, there is a large amount of literature. See, e.g., REBECCA EDWARDS,
ANGELS IN THE MACHINERY: GENDER IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Oxford University Press, 1997).
5. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 240 (1918).
6. Id. at 330.
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the way the fact that the South was laying track with slave labor as
fast as the North was with free. "[U]nsophisticated" places, she wrote,
were those "where there are no railroads."7 Walt Whitman extolled
the democratic promise of the technology: "Type of the modern-em-
blem of motion and power-pulse of the continent .... Law of thyself
complete, thine own track firmly holding... Launch'd o'er the prairies
wide, across the lakes, [t]o the free skies unpent and glad and
strong."8
Railroads did appear to be a "law unto themselves." They defied
conventional restraints of power and speed and, in so doing, recon-
figured the experience of time and space. Their effect was so
profound, so pervasive, that even those places without them in the
nineteenth century conformed to railroad time and railroad space.
The nearly ubiquitous nineteenth-century observation to capture this
effect was that railroads "annihilated space and time."9 The rapid ad-
vance of technology inspired trepidation and awe, fear and admira-
tion, anxiety and confidence. Americans felt the need to make an
accommodation to the railroads-to reconcile the losses (peace and re-
pose turned into ugly landscapes, noise, and smoke) with the progres-
sive force of the machinery (harmony, civilization, and
advancement). 10
After the Civil War, however, doubts about the railroads wafted in
the political, social, and intellectual air like the thick smoke from their
stacks, and in Bryan's day the railroads had become simultaneously
the means of national, regional, and local vitality and the symbols of
corruption, dependency, subservience, and monopoly. The scandal of
the Union Pacific's subsidiary Credit Mobilier in 1872-1873 tarnished
the nation's premier railroad project.' 1 The strike of 1877 sounded
other alarms, as middle-class Americans feared what the railroads
seemed to have made possible: a mass social protest rooted in eco-
nomic inequality, inflamed by corporate callousness, and spread
across the very rail network Americans thought would bind the nation
together. 12
7. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE ToM's CABIN 283 (The Library of America,
1982) (1852).
8. WALT WHITMAN, To a Locomotive in Winter, in LEAVES OF GRASS 253 (Doubleday,
1923) (1891-1892).
9. LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL
IN AMERICA 194. (Oxford Univfersity Press, 1964); WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE
RAILWAY JOURNEY: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PERCEPTION OF TIME AND SPACE (Uni-
versity of California Press, 1986).
10. For a thorough history of railroad law, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND
AMERICAN LAW (2001).
11. See Richard White, Information, Markets, and Corruption: Transcontinental
Railroads in the Gilded Age, 90 J. AM. HIST. 19 (2003).
12. On the strike see ROBERT V. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE (1959); PHILIP S.
FONER, THE GREAT LABOR UPRISING OF 1877 (1977); WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZ-
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By the turn of the century, one of the nation's most prominent and
accomplished economists, Balthasar Henry Meyer, concluded that the
railroads touched every aspect of American life. "The introduction of
railways," he cautioned, "created a new world. So accustomed have we
become to a civilization with railways that it requires conscious efforts
to realize the economic, social, political and moral influences which
have emanated from them."13 It seemed staggering to him that the
railroad corporations paid in dividends the equivalent of two dollars
per year for every person living in the United States. Of course, these
dividends went not to the mass of citizens but to the small fraction of
Americans who were stockholders. He noted, furthermore, that mod-
ern nation-states were using the railroad technologies for geopolitical
purposes-Russia, for example, was building railroads to secure the
"permanent control of Manchuria."14 Meyer concluded that to achieve
social progress, the railroads needed a "harness" and, as he put it,
"this harness is the law."15
Despite Meyer's confidence in the law, fitting it to harness the rail-
roads would not prove easy. The crisis that both he and Henry Adams
saw was one that we are familiar with today-the consequences of
what we loosely call "globalization"-and it was exceedingly difficult
to constrain through the law. We can draw some parallels between
the 1890s and the 1990s in this regard. Sweeping changes in technol-
ogy, in the alignment of capital markets, in the expansive competition
of nation-states, and in the consolidation of big businesses contributed
to both severe dislocation and extraordinary profitability. Barriers be-
tween markets collapsed; time and space were reconfigured. Histo-
rian Robert Schwartz has called this period the "first globalization
crisis" for England and France, as these changes affected rural migra-
tion patterns, agricultural production, urban development, and politi-
cal party formation.16
Bryan faced similarly sweeping currents in Nebraska. The rail-
roads were responsible, for example, for virtually shutting down the
ING AMERICA: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1995); SHELTON STROMQUIST, A GENER-
ATION OF BOOMERS: THE PATTERN OF RAILROAD LABOR CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1987); DAVID 0. STOWELL, STREETS, RAILROADS AND THE
GREAT STRIKE OF 1877 (1999).
13. BALTHASAR HENRY MEYER, RAILWAY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1903).
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
16. Robert Schwartz, Presentation at the American Historical Association Confer-
ence: Railways, Uneven Geographic Development, and a Crisis of Globalization
in France and Britain, 1830-1914 (Jan. 2007). See also, Sven Beckert, Emancipa-
tion and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the
Age of the American Civil War, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 1405 (2004) (for an analysis of
global markets); Sven Beckert, From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom
in the Empire of Cotton, 92 J. AM. HIST. 498 (2005) (also discussing global
markets).
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wheat and small grain economy of the middle-Atlantic states when the
big farms of Illinois, Indiana, and eventually Minnesota and Nebraska
came on line. Whole regional economies collapsed, and new ones de-
veloped in the wake of railroad extension. The railroads, in effect, be-
gan a process of market extension across boundaries, of market
change both positive and negative, of interstate and multinational cor-
porations, and of special interest involvement in politics. In addition
to all of these, they shaped and sustained cultural ideas about space
and gender; work and family; and liberty and citizenship. 17
Obviously, one of the great concerns of nineteenth-century Ameri-
cans was the unprecedented size and power of these companies. The
railroads in the 1890s were being consolidated and merged, as court
appointed receivers attempted to reconstitute the companies out of the
wreckage of the 1893 depression. The resulting systems, financed
largely by J.P. Morgan, were, in the words of the day, "colossal" or
"gigantic" enterprises. When the Southern Railway, for example,
emerged out of the defunct Richmond Terminal system, the Omaha
Bee could not help but take notice. The system amassed over 4,500
miles of track, and the Omaha Bee warned Southern states that they
would need "stronger governmental regulation to hold the railroads
within their legitimate sphere" and that they would "soon appreciate
the burden of railroad domination which the western states are now
trying to lift."18
If the scale of these companies was a concern, then their cozy rela-
tionship with government officials cast serious doubt on the idea of
ever containing them to a "legitimate sphere." When President Cleve-
land, for example, hopped on the private car of the president of the
Pennsylvania Railroad to go on fishing trips to the Chesapeake Bay's
eastern shore, eyebrows (Republican and Democrat) all over the coun-
try were raised. Cleveland began his first term with a vow to pay his
own way on the railroads, though he soon accepted free rides from the
companies. Benjamin Harrison, his successor in the Oval Office,
firmly resisted luxury trip offers. The Omaha Bee reported that the
Pennsylvania's presidential car was Cleveland's "favorite vehicle" and
it is easy to see why. The interior of the car was "a dream of beauty
and luxury."19 It came with a "cook's store room, which contains the
17. On the globalization and modernity railroads helped create, see, e.g., IAN CLARK,
GLOBABLIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY (1997); JORGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZA-
TION: A SHORT HISTORY (2005); ERIC RAUCHWAY, BLESSED AMONG NATIONS: How
THE WORLD MADE AMERICA (2006). On gendered spaces and the railroads, see
AMY RICHTER, HOME ON THE RAILS: WOMEN, THE RAILROAD, AND THE RISE OF PUB-
LIC DOMESTICITY (2005); WELKE, BARBARA, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GEN-
DER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001).
18. A Colossal Railway Consolidation, OMAHA BEE, September 6, 1894, at 4.
19. Cleveland's Private Car, OMAHA BEE, September 6, 1894, at 4.
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rarest delicacies of the table and the finest of wines ... a wide, roomy
bed chamber, bath room, literary and observation room."20 Cooks,
servants, and "nimble-fingered attendants" traveled with the car, and
the car arrived in Washington fully stocked whenever Cleveland re-
quested it. This controversy, over what was called "deadheading,"
symbolized the insidious power of the largest railroads to corrupt the
highest levels of government. When Cleveland sent federal troops to
Chicago in July 1894 to enforce court injunctions against striking rail-
road workers, few were surprised. 2 1
The Omaha Bee considered itself a kind of watchdog over corporate
power and political corruption, and by the 1890s its editor, Edward
Rosewater, became the leading Republican voice for railroad reform in
Nebraska. However, the problem of the railroads, indeed the problem
of the trusts, was not a simple matter of specific issues, such as high
rates or rebates on railroads. "It is striking that Bryan's middle-class
followers," Michael Kazin noted, "spent little time railing against the
trusts; their letters and memoirs include few specific protests against
a big business that injured their dignity or threatened their economic
independence. Far more salient was their desire for a moral alterna-
tive to the corporate order as a whole." 22 Bryan's middle-class follow-
ers, of course, were also the least likely to be threatened in direct ways
by the trusts, though, like Henry Adams, they too may have felt "mort-
gaged" to them. The important point here is that Bryan tried to artic-
ulate a moral alternative, while he simultaneously appealed to those
directly affected by the changing nature of the railroad-based
economy. 2 3
As a Democratic political candidate, Bryan naturally opposed any
form of special advantages for corporations. In this respect, he was
not far from the convictions of the Nebraska Democratic leader, J.
Sterling Morton, whose brand of democratic conservativism was
strictly laissez-faire. He opposed subsidies for corporations as much
as he did overregulation. "Railroads born before their time," Morton
explained at a centennial address in 1876 in Nebraska City,
are commercial deformities-monetary monsters which first consume the sub-
stance of the people, and then turn upon their proprietors to rend and destroy
them also. Physical deformities are incarnate protestations against violations
of natural laws; and commercial boa-constrictors in the form of railroads,
through peopleless and cropless counties, are denunciations of the policy
which donates into life railroads before there is anything legitimate for rail-
roads to do.2 4
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. KAZIN, supra note 1, at 214.
23. Id.
24. J. STERLING MORTON, A COMMEMORATIVE PAMPHLET 23 (1876).
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Morton crusaded against the idea that western settlers had "made
something out of nothing." All such speculative building and fi-
nance-whether of railroads, towns, or crops-was, he thought,
shameful and unnatural. By the time of his campaign for the U.S.
Senate in 1894, Bryan had already begun to veer off from Morton's
conservative democratic principles against interference in the econ-
omy and to head into murky and uncharted waters for his party, but
his essential argument against the railroads echoed much of what
Morton had said earlier.
So, in the fall of 1894, William Jennings Bryan found himself in
the fight of his young political career. He had resigned his seat in the
U.S. House and was seeking election to the United States Senate. He
faced John M. Thurston, a railroad attorney for the Union Pacific, an
experienced Republican leader, a close associate of James G. Blaine,
and a formidable debater. Thurston not only was a Union Pacific law-
yer, but also was an appointed receiver for the bankrupted railroad.
In 1893, Thurston considered putting himself forward as a possible
U.S. Senate candidate, but he stepped out of the race to concentrate on
his law practice with the Union Pacific. Despite his public with-
drawal, desperate Nebraska Republicans in 1893 still tried to elect
him, but they lost in the legislature when, in a remarkable move,
Democrats and Populists succeeded in electing William V. Allen to the
U.S. Senate, the first non-Republican ever elected to the Senate in Ne-
braska. So, in 1894, Republicans knew that they needed Thurston,
and they turned to him to carry the campaign against the Democrats
and Populists.25
As the campaign got underway, the editor of the republican Omaha
Bee, Edward Rosewater, broke with the Republicans whom he consid-
ered bought by the railroads. Rosewater was a longtime opponent of
monopolies and railroads, and he generally hoped to thwart John
Thurston's brand of business republicanism.2 6 He had opposed the
nomination of Chauncey M. Depew for president in 1888, while Thur-
ston backed him. The potential nomination of Depew, a railroad direc-
tor on the Vanderbilt's New York Central lines, seemed to some
Republicans a betrayal of a "sacred trust" to represent the working
people. The Chicago Daily Tribune backed Rosewater, claiming that
the party that had for its mission the relief of the oppressed of all races; that
gave free homes to millions of the homeless; that struck the shackles from the
limbs of four millions of slaves; that made the poorest laborer the peer of the
25. Senator Allen from Nebraska: End of the Long Fight by the Election of a Populist,
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 8, 1893.
26. For some of the background on Rosewater and Republican infighting, see Re-
signed in Dudgeon: Editor Rosewater Bolts the Nomination of Majors, WASHING-
TON POST, Aug. 23, 1894, at 1.
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millionaire, cannot and must not stultify itself by kneeling at the shrine of
railroad billionaires. 2 7
After years of determined and tough infighting and even tougher
struggles in 1894 at the state convention, Rosewater bitterly stepped
down from the Republican National Committee and issued a stinging
letter of resignation. He accused the Nebraska Republicans of turning
the Capitol building into a "den of debaucheries" and selling out to
corporate interests. The convention delegates cheered loudly at the
news of Rosewater's resignation and quickly elected John M. Thurston
to the National Committee in his place.
The 1894 Nebraska Republican Party platform called for some sen-
sible adjustments to curb railroad power, such as the enforcement of a
maximum rate act and a constitutional bar on fictitious, over-capital-
ized companies. Nevertheless, Rosewater fumed that the Burlington
Railroad had bribed party delegates to nominate Thomas Majors for
governor, a state delegate, he charged, "who has for years consorted
only with railroad ringsters and boodle state officials." 28 Majors, he
wrote, had "been the pliant tool of the railroads in season and out of
season" and was nominated "by the combined influence of corporate
cappers, professional bribe-givers, jury-fixers, and impeached State
House officials." 2 9 Majors was popular and known widely as "Blue
Shirt" Majors, because he always appeared in public clad in blue to
emphasize his Civil War service in the First Nebraska Volunteers.
Majors claimed to represent the farmers, the average Republicans,
and the soldiers of the Civil War. Rosewater depicted himself as a
crusader for the rights and interests of the "workingman" against the
big corporate power that he saw infecting the democratic process, and
a voice of true republican principles. "There is an old German adage,"
he warned, "if you go to bed with dogs, you are sure to get up with
fleas."30 So, Rosewater put a notice in the Omaha Bee: "All Republi-
cans who are opposed to the domination of railroads and desire to re-
sent the attempt to make the party subservient to corporate
monopolies and public thieves" were invited to write him. 3 1
And they did. All sorts of opinions came from around Nebraska.
Rosewater probably published them all. One wrote of the "brass col-
lar" that the Burlington fitted around Lancaster County, another of
the "monopoly ridden ... gang of pirates" in the party hierarchy, an-
other of railroad employees instructed by the executives on who they
27. Nebraska Republicans Will Kick: Protest of the Omaha "Bee" Against Threatened
Monopoly Leadership, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, June 13, 1888, at 7.
28. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 29, 1894 at 4.
29. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 28, 1894 at 4.
30. Untitled, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 24, 1894, at 4; Where Nebraska Stands, CHICAGO
DAILY TRIBUNE, June 7, 1892 at 1.
31. To Nebraska Republicans, OMAHA BEE, August 26, 1894, at 12.
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should vote for in no uncertain terms.3 2 Rosewater's Republican oppo-
sition to the power of the railroads focused mainly on their political
corruption. But he noted that every good or service in America de-
pended on them and the result was that a fraction of everything
bought and sold in the United States went to the railroads. "Every
person in the United States-native, naturalized, alien, sojourner, or
traveler-pays tribute, directly or indirectly, to our railroads, every
day," Rosewater emphasized, wrapping his argument in outrage at the
dependence and subservience that railroads seemed to cause wherever
they were extended. 33 Not all Nebraska Republicans appreciated
Rosewater's righteous indignation. The Nebraska State Journal saw
Rosewater as motivated by nothing more than a personal vendetta
against the Republican gubernatorial candidate.
.-~f~ -6' *lIf .. :;' ,V -Y~i tfM M . - . . I ti Yflv . t _
~f
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Republican editor Edward Rosewater emerged as the leading anti-railroad voice in the
Nebraska Senate election of 1894 between William Jennings Bryan and John M. Thur-
ston. Source: Omaha Bee, November 3, 1894 at 1.
At the same time, Rosewater and Bryan, as editors and leading
voices against railroad involvement in politics, applauded the chang-
ing economy that the railroads made possible. They covered the do-
32. What Shall We Do To Be Saved, OMAHA BEE, September 8, 1894, at 1.
33. Railroads and the People, OMAHA BEE, Sept. 16, 1894, at 13.
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ings of the railroad business, the "railroad gossip," the comings and
goings of the railroad men, the changing dynamics of the region's ser-
vice. The railroad seemed to sustain and-in many arenas of opera-
tion-to cultivate an expansive culture of workingmen and families:
family travel and excursions, middle-class domesticity and gender val-
ues, independent laborers, and ideas about progress.
More than this, expanding the railroad system was championed
not feared, even in the depression, as furthering national, regional,
and local progress. When the Burlington line opened a new road into
Wyoming and Montana that joined the Northern Pacific, Rosewater
was full of praise and excitement for the same nefarious corporation
he railed against day after day for its political corruption. The new
route ran from Sheridan, Wyoming, to Billings, Montana. Its opening
reconfigured the position of Omaha and Lincoln on a changing map of
linked economies. Figuratively speaking, their "location" changed
with the opening of this new route, but few thought of these matters in
figurative terms-such changes were considered quite literal. "The
building of this line is of incalculable benefit to Omaha, Kansas City,
St. Louis, Chicago, bringing a territory of some 1,500 miles in extent
almost to the doors of these cities," Rosewater exclaimed. 34 It was, in
effect, a drastic short cut to the Northwest shaving off 295 miles of a
trip from Omaha to Helena, 385 miles off the trip to Spokane. The
consequences were that a region that had been a "sealed book" to
wholesalers in the Missouri Valley was now opened, and what had
been a "monopoly" controlled by St. Paul and Minneapolis was "now
for the first time brought into civilization's rim."35 The agent of all
this progress was, of course, the "progressive pioneer methods of the
Burlington system of rails."3 6 The fact that the system now encom-
passed nearly 7,000 miles was not considered a threat in this context
but a great advantage.3 7
With the republican press in Omaha giving the loudest and clear-
est voice against the trusts and their political corruption but simulta-
neously opposing the Democrats and Populists, Bryan faced a difficult
situation. Early in the campaign, as early as June, Bryan's Republi-
can opposition focused on the "fanaticism" of Bryan's stand on the "sil-
ver question."38 And although the Omaha Bee would not publicly
endorse John Thurston, it did not actively oppose him either.
34. Through Historic Fields, OMAHA BEE, Oct. 29, 1894, at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Makes Work for Railroads, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 29, 1894, at 7 (discuss-
ing Union Pacific's advantage over slower, southern routes).
38. Nebraskan Republican League: In Convention at Lincoln the Silver Difficulty is
Neatly Avoided, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 13, 1894, at 1.
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The most dramatic events of the 1894 campaign were without
question the two joint debates between Bryan and Thurston, a senato-
rial square off that seemed to many observers to approach the na-
tional scale and importance of the Lincoln-Douglas debates half of a
century earlier. Seven thousand people attended the first debate, and
fifteen thousand attended the second. So many people arrived to hear
the men that the debate was moved from the Opera House in Lincoln
to the state fair ground's largest building, Mechanical Hall. The Uni-
versity of Nebraska political clubs turned out in force and local leaders
presided. Mrs. Bryan and Mrs. Thurston took prominent seats on the
platform while their husbands stood for the debate. Surprisingly,
Bryan, the great orator, was outmatched, and Thurston performed
with a staggeringly effective blend of powerful logic, political savvy,
and emotional passion.
Bryan began his address not with the silver issue, nor with rail-
road political corruption, nor with the "trust problem," but with the
idea of a federal income tax and with the Democratic Party plank call-
ing on the government to foreclose its loans to the Pacific railroads as
soon as they come due. The railroad problem for Bryan was linked not
so much to corruption but to the question of fairness and opportunity
for the workingman. Bryan asked who paid the taxes, and then
pointed out that regressive taxation on liquor and tobacco, and tariff
duties on everything, made working people pay more for clothes, food,
and basic necessities. Meanwhile, Bryan implied (without directly ac-
cusing or naming Thurston or Union Pacific), that the stockholders in
the Pacific railroads had a privileged position, one that the people, as
the chartering agent of the railroads, had bestowed upon them. The
logic of foreclosing on the railroad loans was, it should be said, some-
what counterintuitive: Bryan figured that once free of the government
debt and forced to consolidate, the watered stock would be drained off
and the railroads' valuation would be more accurate. Bryan pointed
out that these companies paid out large dividends throughout the loan
period and yet claimed to be unable to pay the principle and interest
back to the government on schedule. Because they were overcapital-
ized and in debt, the railroads charged excessively high rates, and
Nebraskans paid. "The roads have collected the money and put it
down in their own pockets," Bryan thundered to great applause, "and
we deny the justice of ... collect[ing] money a second time from the
people who have already paid it."39 Extending the loans, Bryan rea-
soned, would mean only that "the people along the line of the road"
would be making payments in the higher rates they paid on every-
thing they shipped.40
39. The Battle of the Giants, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 18, 1894, at 2.
40. Id.
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Thurston, as anyone might expect of an experienced corporate law-
yer, did not wilt before the challenge of his opponent, whom he earlier
lampooned as "Billy Windmill Bryan." In addresses to local Republi-
can nominating meetings after all, Thurston ridiculed Bryan's move
into the newspaper editorial ranks, at one point calling him a "puny,
petty, populistic, political pissmire."41
In the debates, Thurston was more dignified. His first move was to
bring up what Bryan left unsaid in his focus on the Pacific railroads-
that he, Thurston, was in the employ of one of them. Thurston was
proud of work and claimed he "came across the Missouri river twenty-
five years ago.... without an acquaintance or a friend.... an un-
known boy."4 2 He called himself a self-made man who was selected
"without any solicitation on my part to stand at the head of the law
department of the greatest railway system of the civilized world."
4 3
He stated plainly for all to hear that since becoming a candidate for
the Senate, he had left the Union Pacific and did not represent "a sin-
gle railway corporation of the earth, a bondholder, a stockholder or
any other interest therein."44
Thurston stood before the voters, then, as the ideal man of Henry
Adams' railroad generation, one who had searched out and found what
he was "fit" for. Unlike Bryan who seemed aloof at times in his un-
willingness to take railroad clients, Thurston placed himself as part of
the wide movement of the times in which, as Henry Adams put it,
"society dropped every thought of dealing with anything more than
the single fraction called a railway system."4 5 And he drew great ap-
plause with this story of his coming up and his commitment to doing
his "duty." Thurston depicted himself first and foremost as a working-
man, albeit one who had risen to positions of great opportunity and
authority.
Thurston then took up the issue of the Pacific roads' mortgages.
He considered it astounding that Bryan would consider letting the
railroads off the hook by canceling their loans and quickly pointed out
just how out of step Bryan was with the conservative members of his
own party. Bryan, in other words, stood before the voters not only as
an advocate of silver coinage and monetary inflation, but also of the
repudiation of debts, a conceptually broader threat to the republic.
Thurston linked both the silver issue and the tariff issue into a de-
fense of the working people in a globalized economy arguing that
Bryan essentially misunderstood the great changes of the age around
him. "Every laboring man in this union," Thurston claimed, "whether
41. Thurston on Bryan, OMAHA BEE, Aug. 25, 1894, at 1.
42. The Battle of the Giants, supra note 39, at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ADAMs, supra note 5, at 240.
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in the shop, upon the farm, or in the mine, should be protected from
the competition of the pauper labor of the whole world outside."46
Thurston hammered the Democrats for the fall in the price of wheat,
the loss ofjobs, and the failure to "take care of American industries."47
What the American workingman wanted, he said, was work-not free
silver.48
The republican Nebraska State Journal, perhaps not surprisingly,
deemed Thurston's effort "masterly ... a legal and logical argument
based on the principles of republicanism." 49 Bryan, on the other hand,
was "eloquent but illogical and inconsistent," mired by the obvious
chasm between his views and those of the Democratic administration
in power.SO Bryan committed a grievous political error, the paper
maintained, when he ignored the heritage of Jefferson and Jackson
and instead puffed "his ambitious plans for reforming the universe."5 1
The Chicago Daily reported that "long-continued cheers" for Thurston
marked the debate.52 Nearly every paper considered it the greatest
joint debate in Nebraska history and a harbinger of the coming 1896
presidential election.5 3
Bryan, for his part, shrugged off the accusations after the debate
that he was a populist demagogue, saying "in these latter days he is a
statesman whose ear is tuned to catch the slightest pulsation of the
pocketbook, but he is a demagogue who dares to listen to the heart
beat of humanity."5 4 The ease and flippant nature of Bryan's post-
debate comments hid the depth of the political problem he faced.
Bryan's oratory in the debate could not overcome the force of Thur-
ston's argument, and the ways that argument linked workingmen to
the Republican vision.
One of the most perceptive summaries of the debates in Bryan's
Omaha World Herald came from Elia W. Peattie. A journalist and
writer, Peattie produced a number of travelogues for Rand McNally
and several American history texts in the early 1890s, as well as a
collection of gothic short stories, including An Astral Onion and The
Shape of Fear.55 Peattie was commissioned to cover the debates and
46. The Battle of the Giants, supra note 39, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The Big Debate, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Untitled, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 4.
52. Rivals for a Toga: Thurston and Bryan Engage in Debate in Lincoln, CHICAGO
DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct. 18, 1894, at 5.
53. The Big Debate, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 1; The Battle of the
Giants, supra note 39, at 2; Rivals for a Toga: Thurston and Bryan Engage in
Debate in Lincoln, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Oct. 18, 1894, at 5.
54. Bryan Closes, NEBRASKA STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1894, at 3.
55. ELIA PEATTIE, IMPERTINENCES: SELECTED WRITINGS OF ELIA PEA'TrIE, A JOURNAL-
IST IN THE GILDED AGE (Susan George Bloomfield ed., 2005).
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to tell readers "how a woman viewed it all."5 6 She pointed out that for
every fifty men in the audience of fifteen thousand, there was one wo-
man, but that the women had their own points of view.5 7 Peattie,
playing on widely accepted Victorian gender differences, suggested to
her readers that women made political decisions from the heart and
not from the brain. Having appealed to the gender conventions of her
readers, probably in part to disarm them and draw them in, Peattie
eventually set "joking aside." "Mr. Thurston looked secretive," she re-
ported from the smoke filled chamber, "Mr. Bryan frank; Mr. Thur-
ston was thin, with drooping shoulders; Bryan stalwart, with square
shoulders, suggestive of protection; Mr. Thurston exceedingly intellec-
tual, rather cautious, and full of reservation; Mr. Bryan essentially
candid, very argumentative and fascinatingly impulsive."5 8 She went
on to describe Bryan's Jove-like facial features and his "compelling
magnetism."59
Peattie cast everything in contrast. Bryan had the "dash and fury
of youth;" Thurston was tempered by experience. Bryan was a
prophet; Thurston an advocate. Bryan spoke truths; Thurston old
platitudes. Peattie went so far as to comment on both men's poor taste
in fashion, taking them to task for wearing trousers that "bag at the
knees."6o Summing it all up, she gave what might be an enduring
portrait, when she said,
Mr. Thurston is a remarkably clever man and a very adroit one. He is past
master of the art of what not to say. Mr. Bryan has a spark of genius which
would make any cause popular which he espoused, and which, if he used it as
a sacred thing, for the good of his fellow man and the glory of God, will yet
make him one of the great men of the nation.
6 1
After the debates, the Republicans took out a full-page advertise-
ment in Bryan's Omaha World Herald and made plain their view of
what was at stake.62 Their argument hinged on the idea of a
networked economy, an organic system which Nebraska voters, if mis-
led by Bryan and his populist\ democratic fusion, would easily upset.
Republicans held that Omaha, Nebraska was built with "muscle,
money, and mind."63 The workingman provided the muscle, the east-
ern capitalist the money, and the Nebraska businessmen the mind or
vision. Harmony among these three would allow the region to grow,
while a rupture in these relations would injure workingmen and choke
56. How A Woman Viewed It All, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 21, 1894, at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Railroad Cry, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Nov. 1, 1894, at 4; Good Old Times, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Nov. 2, 1894 at 4.
63. Railroad Cry, supra note 62, at 4.
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off growth. The Republicans of 1894 appealed to the "silent" majority
of voters whose conservativism could be counted on to resist populist
and democratic excesses. 64
With this logic, the Republicans swept the legislative elections,
though the election of Thurston to the Senate seat was by no means
assured. Rivals quickly emerged, including the defeated gubernato-
rial candidate Tom Majors. Majors' supporters accused Thurston of
"knifing Majors during the recent campaign."6 5 Thurston, however,
was elected to the U.S. Senate by the Republican caucus on January 1,
1895.
Thurston outlined for the press "the principles that would govern
him" in the Senate in a New Year's Day announcement. The railroad
lawyer quickly took on the mantle of reform and stitched to it a com-
mitment to workingmen and a thoroughgoing, vibrant Americanism.
Thurston rattled off a long list of short phrases (sound bites) as his
principles: "a free ticket to China for any man who insists upon his
right to buy the product of human labor without paying a fair price to
the brain and brawn which produces it;" a one-term presidency; direct
election of senators; "governmental supervision and control of trans-
portation lines and rates;" "the protection of the people from unlawful
combination and unjust exaction of aggregated capital and corporate
power;" "war on the three great . . . trusts-oil, whisky and sugar;"
and finally, a thorough American patriotism-"an American flag for
every American school house."66 Thurston then announced that he
would retire from any legal work involving railroads. He wanted "to
relieve the republican party of Nebraska from even the apparent re-
sponsibility" of electing a bought man. 67
So, Thurston started off the year in 1895 no longer a railroad law-
yer and, like Theodore Roosevelt later in the presidency, began his
term in the Senate with an effort to co-opt key elements of the progres-
sive reform agenda his opponent William Jennings Bryan had advo-
cated. He appeared before the Nebraska legislature in mid-January
to accept its nomination and to outline his views of the coming Con-
gressional session. Thurston called first and foremost for a tough pro-
tective tariff. He was convinced that
the prosperity of this country and its people, especially of the industrial
masses, depends upon the broadest application of the American idea that
whatever labor is to be done for the people of the United States shall be done
by the people of the United States under the Stars and Stripes, and that the
64. Id.; Good Old Times, supra note 62, at 4.
65. The Nebraska Senatorship: Active Rivalry Among Prominent Republicans, WASH-
INGTON POST, Nov. 22, 1894, at 1.
66. Senator John M. Thurston: Joint Caucus Ends All Speculation, OMAHA BEE, Jan.
2, 1895, at 4.
67. Id.
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prices of the products of American labor shall be fixed by American conditions
and American competition. 6 8
As a new U.S. Senator, Thurston vaulted into the ranks of Republi-
can leadership. He served on the National Committee for the GOP
and attracted the attention of national reporters with his story of suc-
cess. The Los Angeles Times' Frank G. Carpenter, for example, fea-
tured him as "the boy hunter of Nebraska" who, like Lincoln, had
grown up on the prairie "[flishing for pickerel for a living and trapping
muskrats" to become a successful lawyer. 69 He became National
Party Chairman in 1896 and gave speeches all over the country, in-
cluding the Cooper Union in New York City. At nearly every venue,
he delivered "electrifying" speeches and was greeted with loud and
sustained applause from Republicans in large part because he had be-
sted Democratic presidential nominee Bryan in the 1894 race. 70
In retrospect, it might seem that Bryan faced an impossible chal-
lenge in 1894. Michael Kazin's A Godly Hero suggests as much.7 1 Af-
ter all, the conventional answer to why Bryan lost might be that
corporate interests bought the election, as they did a year earlier in
Virginia where the obscure railroad attorney Thomas Staples Martin
was elected to the U.S. Senate over the popular former governor Fitz-
hugh Lee, nephew of Robert E. Lee. The Democrats were divided,
moreover, with J. Sterling Morton thoroughly opposed to Bryan's alli-
ance with the populists and his soft money ideas. There was in 1894,
moreover, a massive depression gripping the nation, and the Demo-
cratic administration of President Grover Cleveland was widely de-
spised. As if these strikes against him were not enough, the railroads,
banks, and insurance companies raised money to support Thurston
while Bryan's campaign ran out of money. 72
Yet, for all of these obvious advantages, John Thurston saw him-
self as the underdog. Writing years later in 1915, Thurston main-
tained that he "plunged into the 1894 contest alone" and that the
68. Chosen Leaders: John M. Thurston Represents Nebraska, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1895, at 2. See also, JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF QUESTION IN THE
GILDED AGE: THE GREAT DEBATE OF 1888 (Pennsylvania State University Press,
1994) (discussing the tariff).
69. Frank G. Carpenter, John M. Thurston: The Boy Hunter of Nebraska in the
United Stats Senate, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 1895, at 25.
70. Id.; The Convention Enlivened: Thurston Becomes Permanent Chairman and is
Greeted with Great Enthusiasm, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 4, 1896, at 4; Thurston
on the Stump: Nebraskan Starts Ball Rolling at Madison on Friday, CHICAGO
DAILY TRIBUNE, July 30, 1896, at 4; Thurston Scores Boy Orator: Nebraska Sena-
tor Speaks at Cooper Union, New York, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Sept. 6, 1896, at
6.
71. KAZIN, supra note 1.
72. Id.
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Union Pacific did not give him "one dollar."7 3 Thurston ignored the
businessmen's associations that mobilized their own money to cam-
paign on his behalf and instead focused on the statewide campaign
speeches both he and Bryan made bringing the election of the U.S.
Senator to the people. He considered himself "elected by the people"
and thought that many observers underestimated the difficulty he
faced and the temper of the times. "Nebraska had not had a Republi-
can legislature for six years," Thurston noted,
It had been controlled by the forces of the Democratic and Populist parties,
both of which nominated Mr. Bryan. We had a populist Democratic Governor
and United States Senator. The prospect of success seemed very small and
everybody thought I was leading a forlorn hope.
7 4
Thurston considered his triumph "astounding."7 5
Thurston's memory may have been clouded, but his perspective
provides a useful lens through which to see Bryan's campaign. His-
torians have been too quick, perhaps, to excuse Bryan for his political
losses by suggesting that he was simply up against long odds, that
powerful forces brought him down, or that his crusades were quixotic.
At least in 1894 Bryan's campaign was not unreasonable. That he
failed should not, however, be surprising. Bryan faced an extraordi-
narily canny, tough, and dedicated opponent in John M. Thurston,
who was able to articulate a powerful defense of Republicanism for
workingmen.
Two years later, in 1896, Thurston campaigned for William McKin-
ley against Bryan and stumped across the Midwest with his speech
"To American Workingmen." In attacking Bryan and the silver issue,
Thurston used the slogan, "a promise of something for nothing is false
and dangerous to the people."76 Thurston thoroughly dismantled the
silver question in his long speeches, but he reserved his emotional en-
ergy for his dismissal of Bryan. "No man who appeals to class
prejudice," Thurston argued, "who incites the populace to tear down
those who have succeeded in life; no man who puts sectionalism above
nationalism, can ever be elected President of the United States."77 It
was an easy accusation to make, and its logic proved convincing to
tens of thousands of voters. "Not by tearing down," Thurston cried,
"but by building up, can the common people share in the blessings of
American civilization."78
By the 1890s, railroads penetrated nearly every American commu-
nity and interlocked them in new system-wide territories. Consolida-
73. Eva May Fosbury, Biography of John Mellon Thurston 71-72, n.2 (Aug. 1920)
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Nebraska) (on file with author).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Senator John M. Thurston, To American Workingmen (Sept. 19, 1896).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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tions and mergers helped produce the nation's largest business
corporations, its largest labor unions, and its largest political move-
ments. Yet, communities, individuals, and other institutions adopted
much of the railroad network and attempted to make it their own, a
process that was as confusing, and sometimes contradictory, for the
railroad companies as for the Grangers and the populists. So it was
that William Jennings Bryan could blast the railroads as agents of
monopoly and at the same time derive his life's income from the lec-
ture circuit that the railroads' speed and reliability made possible. So
it was that workingmen might strike against the railroad companies
and at the same time see themselves as its principle agents of growth.
So it was that editors and middle-class voters might voice objections to
railroad corruption and at the same time champion the largest sys-
tems in their region.
The Bryan-Thurston campaign in 1894 signaled the beginning of a
modern political era and pointed to a challenging political problem:
the difficulty of confronting the tight relationship of politics and large
scale business in a time when the society was mortgaged to growth.
Bryan in 1894 and again in 1896, for all of his appeal, his vigor, his
youth, and his oratory, was not just facing entrenched interests
equipped with modern campaign tactics; nor was he simply the voice
of a group bypassed in the emergent modern economy and so a repre-
sentative of the end of an era. Bryan's quest was to capture the work-
ingman's vote that had for decades aligned itself with the Republican
Party despite that party's leadership and orientation toward big busi-
ness. Bryan in the strictest terms was not successful, but politics was
never the same after it.79
79. On the voting dynamics of the period, see THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs, William Novak, & Ju-
lian Zelizer, eds., 2003). See also RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1880-1890 (1984) (discussing political parties
and sectionalism in the United States); and RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000) (places po-
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